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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\ 
RAYMOND R. CANNON, \ 
Plaintiff and Appellant. ) 




J ... t\CK I_j. NElTBl~RG ER and \ BRIFJF 
., 
EVEI_jYN L. NElTBERGER, ' 
Defendants and Respondent;. I 
/ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We do not have too 1nuch objection to the state-
ment of facts presented hy the appellant, but do desire 
to point up some additional, and what we feel to be 
highly pertinent facts. Plaintiff states that Siberian 
elms ''are a nuisance'' tr. 38. Yet, his neighbor, Mary 
Beutler ,(tr. 84) testified that he obtained these elrns 
from her and planted them himself. When the Court 
tried this case, the plaintiff had, in his o'vn yard, a 
large Siberian elm, close to his house. Plaintiff 'vas 
asked on cross examination ( tr. 45) "On these Siberian 
elms, you say they are a nuisance just by being a Siber-
ian Elm"~ A. "That's right, they are". Q. "Why don't 
you cut the one in your own lot down~'' Plaintiff, after 
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denying that he planted the elms, admitted (tr. 46) that 
he got the ehns from his neighbors, across the street, 
(the Beutlers) and planted them hhnself. 
Plaintiff did not claim any damage to his property 
which is termed by the Courts, ''sensible darn age'', 
because he specifically waived any clahn therefor. We 
quote: "Mr. Heinrich: ( tr. 83) One other matter, your 
honor, that we've alleged and which we don't care to 
follow up, and therefore waive, and that's any dam-
ages.'' The real cause of complaint of the plaintiff 
is that the trees on defendant's property, shades his 
property, because (tr. 43) he was asked: ''You think 
you're entitled to have these trees removed because 
they shade your property~'' A. ''I do.'' 
ARGUMENT 
This action could be summed up by pointing to th€l 
attitude of the plaintiff towards his neighbors. There 
were no elms on the block until he brought them from 
across the street (tr. 47). He planted, nurtured gre\v 
on his own lot, exactly the same kind of tree of which 
he complains, but he claims that the elms on his lot are 
not noxious (tr. 47). It is the elms on defendants prop-
erty which are noxious. A decision in this matter could 
have such far reaching effects as to amount almost to 
a public tragedy. During the trial the Court went upon 
the premises (tr. 51), and after a view upon the ground 
returned to Court whereupon the plaintiff waived any 
claim to damages; so that we begin with the proposition 
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that plaintiff has suffered no monotary da1nages. · It 
is conceeded that a person may enjoin a nuisance, even 
if he has a similar one on his own pre1nises. However, 
that proposition pre-supposes the actual existenee of 
the nuisance. Carter v. Chotiner, (Cal.) 291 P. 577 
correctly states the law: 
"When appellants' own acts create the sarne 
type of danger of which they are co1nplaining, 
those acts may certainly be considered in determ-
ining whether respondents' acts actually consti-
tute a nuisance under all the circumstances.'' 
The lovver Court, upon viewing the prernises found 
as a matter of fact that the trees in question did not 
constitute an actionable nuisance. The State depart1nent 
of Agriculture provides a list of \Veeds which have 
been determined to be noxious. This list includes Can-
adian thistle, burdock, morning glory, white top, etc., 
but in our search, nowhere do \Ve find any tree gro'\vn 
in this State as being noxious. 
Our Supreme Court has not passed on the question 
here presented as it pertains to trees, but is has, very 
definitely, defined the limitations surrounding the Inat-
ter of actionable nuisance. It will be reme1nbered by 
members of this Court that the case of Dahl v. Utah Oil 
Refining Co., (Utah, 1927) 262 P. 269 sets out at great 
length the testimony of the con1plaining parties, and 
that a jllry awarded the plaintiff $500.00 damages. 
Plaintiff there, fortified her position by numerous rela-
tives and neighbors, all to no avail, because this Court 
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took the position that no actionable nuisance was shown 
and said: 
''The rule of liability is not absolute and the law 
does not afford redress for every such discont-
fort or annoyance. Extreme rights in this re-
gard cannot be enforced. Of necessity so1ne de-
gree of inconvenience and annoyance must be 
endured or community and social life would be 
impossible. It thus follows that what consti-
tutes in law an actionable nuisance is always 
a question of degree . . . 29Cyc 1157, 1158. The 
law relating to private nuisances is a law of 
degree, and usually turns on the question of fact 
whether the use is reasonable or not under all 
the circumstances. No hard and fast rule con-
trols the subject, for a use that is reasonable un-
der one set of facts would be unreasonable under 
another.'' 
The lower Court found that the use we were making 
of our property was reasonable, provided we so trim-
Ined the tops as to relieve a hazzard. 
In dealing 'vith the matter of trees as a nuisance. 
the authorities are not in full accord. Some states 
follow 'vhat is known as the "Massachusetts rule'', 
(Smith v. Holt-Virginia-128 A. L. R. 1217, and all-
notation and others the so-called ''California rule'', 
Gostina v. Ryland, (Wa.sh.) 199 P. 298 .. 
However, the Supreme Court of California, Bonde 
v. Bishop, 245 P. 2d 617· very recently, in effect, mod-
ified the California rule because that case seems to 
be·. bas·ed on an award. of damages, and said: 
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''The weight of authority is that to the extent 
that limbs or roots extend upon an adjoining 
landowner's property THE LATTER MAY RE-
MOVE THEM, BUT ONLY TO THE BOUND-
ARY LINE'' (ours). 
We take the position, that unless the Dah1 case 
(supra) i:-; to be overruled, this jurisdiction has been 
committed to the 1nore co1nn1on sense doctrine announc-
ed in the Smith v. Holt case (supra): 
''The common sense of the common law has re-
cognized that it is wiser to leave the individual 
to protect himself, if harm results to him fron1 
this exercise of another's right to use his prop-
erty in a reasonable way, than to subject that 
other to the annoyance, and the public to the 
burden, oc atcions at law, which would be likely 
to be innumerable and in many instances, pure-
ly vexatious". The Court further stated: "The 
overhanging branches of a tree not poisonous 
or noxious in its nature are not a nuisance per 
se in such a sense as to sustain an action for 
damages . . . to constitute a cause of action for 
nuisance, there must be not merely a nominal 
but such a sensible and real damage as a sens-
ible person, if subjected to it, would find in-
jurious ... It would be intolerable to give an 
action in case of an innoxious tree whenever 
its growing branches extend so far as to pass 
beyond the boundary line and overhang a neigh-
bor's soil. The neighbor has a remedy in such 
case by clipping the overhanging branches.'' 
The cases are annotated in 18 A. L. R. 655, 76 A. 
L. R. 1111, and 128 A. L. R. 1217. The ·Supreme C-ourt 
of Arizona, Kubby v. Hammond, 198 P. 2d 134, s.urns 
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up the plaintiff's situation by saYJng: 
''The proper re1nedy for minor inconveniences 
arising from an alleged nuisance lies in action 
for damages, rather than injunction". 
In Bonde v. Bishop, (California) supra, the Court 
seemed to have some doubt of its own position, for in 
discussing whether a landowner 1nay cut the overhang-
ing branches, or may compel the owner, by injunction, 
to clear them, the Court said : 
"He apparently has to prove that the encroach-
ment constitutes a nuisance. At least the au-
thorities on this question are not as clear cut 
as on the other''. (The Court was talking about 
the two remedies and the doubt was expressed 
as to the injunctive remedy). 
It would seem that our Court has been much slower 
to grant injunctions than those Courts which follo\v the 
California rule relating to trees. Kinsman v. Utah 
Gas and Coke Co., 177 P. 418-damages allowed, but 
injunction denied. Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-
Products Co., 137 P. 2d 347-damages allowed, but in-
junction denied. Other cases are cited in the Ludlow 
case, but, it would serve no good purpose to multiply 
them here. In Thompson v. Anderson, 153 P. 2d 665, 
This Court refused to enjoin the business, but did enjoin 
to a certain extent the method of operation, such ·as 
unusual noises in the nighttime. That is exactly what 
the lower Court did here; i. ·e. the tops of the t:t•ees' ·and 
dead parts may constitute a. hazzard,. ·so ordered 'them 
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trimed and topped, but not removed. 
The Inost recent Utah case v.re can find on this subject 
is Coon v. Utah Construction Company, 228 P. 2d 997. 
Plaintiff contended defendants trucks damaged his 
home, but failed to prove an~r monotary damages. No 
relief was per1nitted, because defedants operated their 
trucks in the usual manner, and this was held not to 
be an actionable nuisance. The lTtah case of Shaw v. 
Salt Lake City, 224 P. 2d 1037 has not been overlooked, 
but here the construction and operation of a hot-mix 
asphalt plant in the Cottonwood residential was en-
joined prior to commencement of construction. It was 
a nuisance per se. 
In reading over the evidence by l\{r. Cannon, it 
seems to be a fair assumption that he is an eccentric 
person, because, for instance, at p. 37, he complains that 
the morning winds that blow out of Logan Canyon, 
and off College Hill, (from one to two miles east of 
his home, which is only a few rods east of Main Street) 
carry leaves upon his premises. The law of nuisances 
is not designed to assist such people in nurturing their 
own peculiarities. A very interesting and well reason-
ed case is found in Erickson v. Hudson, (Wyo. 1952)., 
249 P. 2d 523. This case involved the rights to main-
tain a "spite-fence'. The Court held that the heighth 
of the fence was made from a purely malevolent spirit 
on defendant's part, and had him lower it. Just as 
we have been ordered to lessen the tree tops. But, the 
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Court further held that n1ueh of plaintiff's \Yoes were 
idiocyncrisies, and that a nor1nal and reasonable person 
would not have been effected. 
We ask the question-if plaintiff can co1npel tlh• 
removal of these trees, how far outside hi~ o'vn prop-
erty line n1ay he successfully use the injunctive remedy~ 
We have seen the streets of Salt LakP (;ity littered 
with branches and lirnbs (to say nothing of leav(-•f;) after 
winds. We submit, that if plaintiff's request is granted, 
it may become an utter impossibility for the sn1all lot 
owner to rnaintain trees and shrubs. Plaintiff states 
in his brief (p. 8) that we are practically denying him 
the use of his property~ states that lawn and flower~ 
will not grow. Yet, when the Court personally went 
upon his premises and returned to Court, plaintiff aban-
doned any claim that he had been damaged. That is 
about the same situation in Erickson v. Hudson, supra., 
and the Wyoming Court simply lessened the heighth of 
the fence as our Court ordered us to top the trees to 
eliminate any danger. 
Logan, we feel it will be conceded, is one of the 
most beautiful cities in Utah. Almost every street in 
the City is bordered on either side by ditches or cul-
verts running with fresh, clear mountain water. In the 
fall, these are constantly filling with leaves and other 
matter blown from nearby trees. This requires con-
stant cleaning. Are these to be abated~ We call this 
matter to the Court's attention to point up the ·fact 
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that courts have adopted the '' co1n1non sense'' doctrine, 
and have refused to apply the California rule, such as 
has been done in the Pacific coast states of California 
and \~V ashington. vV e believe the rule laid down in 
Smith v. Holt, (\Tirginia) supra., to be the more con-
sistent with logic and reason where there has been no 
''sensible damages'' proved or shown. 
The matter of issuance of injunctions against en-
croachments is exhaustively covered in an annotation 
of about 80 pages, in 28 A. L. R. 2d 680. Most of the 
cases relating to trees are there reviewed beginning 
on 749, but no new principles are shown. Probably 
the most frequently quoted case on trees is Gostina 
v. Ryland (Wash.) 199 p. 298. It involved a Lombardy 
poplar and other trees. While the holding in this case 
is contrary to our contention, it is highly noteworthy 
that the Court split 3 to 3, and therefore the decision 
of the lower court was affirmed. The prevailing opin-
ion states exactly the situation before this Court: 
''But, in this case the respondent did describe 
some annoyance and damage-insignificant, it is 
true; so insignificant that respondents did not 
even claim them or prove any amount in dam-
ages". (Note: The Washington Court held that 
while damages were insignificant, they were still 
''sensible damages'', and issued the injunction. 
On the other hand the 3 dissenting justices were 
just as strong in their conviction that there was 
no "sensible damage" proved. Therefore, it 
should be borne in mind, that the lower Court, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
after viewing the premises found as a fact, that 
there were no "sensible damages" to plaintiff.) 
The defendant is pern1anently incapacited ph~·~iea1-
ly, and practically the only enjoyment and comfort in 
the summer thne is enjoying the cool shade of tl1P trees 
on his lot. Such is the case with many other of our 
people. This Court has held that a municipalit)· i~ not 
immune to the extra-ordjnary remedy h)r injunction, 
Shaw v. Salt Lake City, supra. Note 'vhat is testified 
to by the expert called in by plaintiff, at p. 63: 
''The whole Washington Avenue (Ogden) is 
lined with Siberian elm". 
We feel that this Court will take judicial knowledg(-~ 
of the fact that all over the State cities and towns have 
planted populars and other types of trees which now 
overhang, and roots run under private property. To 
say that these are nuisances without proving actual 
damages, and the removal may be compelled by injunc-
tion, seems to us to be a dangerous policy of judicial 
pronouncement. However, we conclude that is is fortun-
ate for our people that we will seldom find one so allergic 
to trees as is this plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEO. D. PRESTON 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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